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Franz Kafka asserted that “writing is an observation which is also an act” 
(qtd. in Blanchot, Space of  Literature 73). All our forms of  writing and text 
contribute to cultural meaning-making: the counterfactual virtuality of  the 
novel, the charged concision of  the poem, the modest, perhaps halting, 
confessions of  an oral tale—these resource us as profoundly as theoretical 
disquisition and philosophical inquiry. Maurice Blanchot, commenting on 
Kafka, suggests that the belief  that writing is an observation which is also 
an act is a form of  confidence, almost metaphysical confidence, in the face of  
bureaucratic phantasms and desolating injustice. It is, in Blanchot’s words, 
“fidelity to the work’s demands, the demands of  grief ” (Space 75). There 
is a solemnity to this statement that is very compelling: it suggests that 
all writing, in a sense, is an assertion against loss, a wish to commit to the 
figure, or figuration, what seems otherwise assigned to wordless compliance 
or surrender. Yet the work’s demand here implicates or assumes a kind of  
redemptive drive, a promise of  reparation within words themselves. I hope 
modestly to affirm this promise by the end of  my paper.
THE DREAM OF BONES
Let me begin, then, with a simple personal story around which I hope to 
rehearse a constellation of  themes: writing across, figuration, writing as act or 
activism. I spent several years of  my childhood living on a former quarantine 
station, a remote settlement of  three buildings on a peninsula in the 
Kimberleys. The nearest town was Broome, where I went for my schooling. 
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The quarantine station was a kind of  emancipated space: imagine sand 
dunes, spinifex, an indigo sky, a single lighthouse, set high on fantastically 
sculptured rocks, a sense—for this child at least, this freckled, skinny girl—of  
imaginative excursions, wind-swept agitation, the utterly lovely, abstracting 
possibilities of  play. The sound of  the ocean was omnipresent, and at night 
the lighthouse striped with regular beaming the circular sky. But in other 
ways the station seemed deterritorialised, without markers of  stable meaning, 
unbounded, ambiguous, indivisibly spacious and full. 
During the Second World War Broome was strafed and bombed by the 
Japanese, and several planes were shot down in flames into the bay. My brothers 
and I talked often of  the aircraft under the water, beyond visibility; but knew too 
that at very low tides, very occasionally, the bombers were exposed. We waited 
for such a tide. With my father and my older brother, I set out and walked a mile 
across the ocean floor, to see the Japanese plane. It was an impressive object—
like a surrealist vision—festooned with corals, weeds, encrustations of  many 
kinds. Its bird shape was intact, but for a broken back and sadly drooping wings. 
It was murky and strange; it was oddly otherworldly. Yet I was disappointed, 
almost distressed, that there was no pilot in the cockpit. I had imagined a 
skeleton, sitting upright, wearing pilot’s bug-eye goggles and a peaked brown 
leather cap (an image derived, I think, from old-fashioned war movies). This 
disappointment initiated a recurring dream. I dreamt I was walking underwater 
on the ocean floor, my limbs heavy and impeded, the waves swelling above my 
head, seeking the long-lost Japanese pilot. What I found here and there were 
drifting bones, which I gathered in the flimsy concave of  my skirt. A thighbone 
here, an ulna there, the small white components of  former hands. The dream 
of  bones, as I now think of  it, is an allegory of  loss and incomplete recovery, 
of  the aesthetic failure to fully figure. And now, as an adult, it seems in retrospect 
to illuminate both my fictive and critical practice: I tend to gather fragments, to 
assemble paratactically, to assume ontological gaps and incompletions. Against 
organic and mimetic models—of  the reconstitution, for example, of  the body 
of  experience, of  textual plenitude and recreated presence—I favour signifying 
absence and the trope of  dis-integration.
THE FRAGMENT AND THE ALLEGORY
My story furnishes an epistemological model and a critical attitude. This is, 
I trust, no narcissistic elaboration, it is a wish to narrativise matters which 
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seem to me intrinsic to all writing practices: the negotiation of  lost histories, 
the power of  idealisation and the wish, even if  unconscious, to embrace or 
to incorporate the body of  an other.
What might it mean to take the fragment or the trace as a paradigm of  
knowledge and to assume that assemblage, not reconstitution, is our critical 
task? In this model it is the manufacture of  intelligible design—rather 
than, say, the explanation of  facts—that generates and constitutes our 
understanding. It also assumes a culture always-already multiple, such as the 
term multiculturalism was intended to convey, and a stance of  intelligent 
scepticism concerning unifying (that is to say monocultural) ideologies of  
nationhood. Ken Gelder’s and Jane M. Jacobs’s Uncanny Australia argued that 
the coexistence of  secular modernity and Aboriginal sacredness predisposes 
our culture to incommensurable division, to a system of  relentless 
transactions between so-called main and minority cultures, to an oscillating 
avowal and disavowal of  indigeneity that we now recognise as the marker 
of  the post-colonial. We are a country, that is to say, internally disharmonious 
and culturally contradictory. Australia has never been a “unity.” Every settler 
colony strives to manufacture ideological unity, but such manufacture is 
characterized by its forms of  perpetual failure.
Norman Tindale’s famous 1940 map of  tribal boundaries (reproduced in the 
Gelder and Jacobs book) imagistically confirms, though in another context, 
the paradigm of  a nation of  disunity. Rather like drought-cracked earth, the 
map pictures a densely crazed surface with hundreds of  irregularly bordered 
areas signifying discrete Aboriginal territories. Tindale’s map, constructed 
and revised over fifty years, was an audacious early act of  presumption 
of  native title, and had the effect, paradoxically, of  rendering visible the 
immense variety and complexity of  Aboriginal knowledges, language 
groups and lands. I’d like to take this map as a kind of  ideogram. Crazed 
and crazy territories, cognitive maps, sites of  memory, memorialisation, 
nostalgic retreat, desire—these are all tokens of  gorgeously fractured space, 
in fact anti-cartographic, if  you will. For the space of  this paper I wish to 
abolish the geometric authority of  state boundaries and ask you to striate 
and derange the surface, to trouble the glaze, as it were, of  our spatial 
imaginary.
(As an aside I would like to add that Tindale was from Adelaide, and worked 
for many years as chief  anthropologist at the South Australian museum. He 
had also spent the first 15 years of  his life in Tokyo, and thus during the 
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Second World War was enlisted in Army intelligence. His job was to visit 
the wreckage sites of  Japanese bombers to try to read them as text, and to 
decipher the aircraft production codes of  the Japanese air-force. Tindale also 
had only one eye—his other was lost in a photographic accident. Thus for 
me he is an oddly irresistible figure.) 
Let us consider the relevance of  spatial readings from a critical position that 
honours the fragment. Michel Foucault once remarked that in the Western 
tradition time has been considered an entity of  “richness, fecundity, life, 
dialectic,” but that space, by contrast, is regarded as “the dead, the fixed, 
the undialectical, the immobile” (qtd. in Soja 15). His critique of  traditional 
historiography includes a plea for the spatial imagination—a cause taken 
up locally by figures like Paul Carter and Robert Dixon—and one of  his 
contributions to this realignment of  critical scrutiny was an essay, “Of  Other 
Spaces,” in which he posited the concept of  the heterotopia.1 Conceived 
as a heterotopia, a system of  multiple sites that are richly particular and 
distinctive, which are irreducible to one another and not susceptible to 
superimposition,2 Australia might be imagined as creatively crazy. Recognition 
of  sites as relations of  power, recognition of  cultural multiplicity and 
immanent difference, means that every act of  writing is writing across. Jean 
Baudrillard said that Foucault’s metaphor makes possible a focus on the 
interstitial, the flows of  power between spaces, the ways in which power and 
knowledge establish our understanding as “relations between sites” (9). To 
quote Foucault: “Endeavouring . . . to decipher discourse through the use 
of  spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at 
which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of  relations 
of  power” (69).
The child, any child, who imagines her own history, re-dreams it, enters 
impossible perspectives (in my case drowned-but-alive), performs the transitive 
and transferential, recognises in an almost intuitive way that her nation has 
various and diverse “situated knowledges” within it. All children apprehend 
in their play, their symbols, their curiosity about otherness, a kind of  proto-
awareness of  heterotopic space. The particular is enchanting; everyday life 
is essentially disunified. This is the condition of  being. Wishing to collect 
the lost other or the otherness of  one’s own place might also be seen as 
intuitively heterotopic: collecting, as Susan Sontag points out, is always 
an act of  redemption; it is always a means by which the “profane relic” 
(Walter Benjamin’s term) is used to establish practical and material forms of  
remembrance, a means by which we recognise multiplicity.
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The other to the fragment, one might argue, is the allegory, or the allegorical 
impulse. I mean not the impulse to produce national master narratives—
which I have already suggested is tendentious and problematic—but to 
regard the small and the local as freighted with more general social relevance 
and ethical gravity. Here is another small story… In 1999, a white lawyer 
spoke at a senate inquiry into human rights on the issue of  mandatory 
sentencing laws in the northern territory: 
To illustrate the absurdity of  the laws, [the lawyer] flamboyantly 
produced a pencil he had stolen on his way into the hearings, and, 
holding it up to the committee, he snapped it, pointing out as he 
did that if  he were charged with the theft and the damage of  the 
pencil, there would be no way for him to avoid a compulsory two 
weeks in jail. He went on to explain that if  on release from jail he 
were to steal another pencil, he would face a compulsory three 
month prison sentence. And if  he were so stubborn, stupid or 
desperate to do it again, the minimum penalty would necessarily 
be a year inside. (Johnson 143) 
(These laws were overturned by the newly elected Labor territory government 
in late 2001.) 
A week after this performance, the lawyer was dismayed to hear of  the suicide 
by hanging in a Darwin cell of  a 15-year-old Aboriginal boy from Groote 
Eylandt. He had been mandatarily sentenced for stealing stationary items 
(among them, a few pencils) and was sent 900 kilometres from his home to 
detention in Darwin. I would want to impute allegorical significance to the 
story of  the immunity of  the white lawyer and the appalling vulnerability of  the 
Aboriginal youth. This ghastly comparison, the implication of  despair, of  child-
suffering, the minor but utterly symbolic theft; these oblige us to understand 
that if  we acknowledge the crazy map, the map that begins with honouring 
difference, the map that seeks to instate a model of  community that does not, 
in Emmanuel Levinas’s terms “absorb the difference of  strangeness” (qtd. in 
Diprose 170), then we must also acknowledge differentials of  power. Writing 
across—or, indeed, reading across—is the negotiation of  symbolic regimes 
which alerts us not just to the precious specificity of  different communities, 
but also to disparities of  serious social implication. As Eva Sallis’s work reminds 
us, some territories of  otherness are enforced, some are heteronymous, not 
autonomous, and mandatory sentencing has been politically relocated by its 
cruel and pre-emptive application to refugees sent to “migrant detention 
centres.” Perhaps writing across includes recognition of  the déjà disparu, the lost 
space, conceptualised in terms of  sites of  erasure or denunciation.
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HAUNTOLOGY
The child seeking the remnants of  a dead man is perhaps seeking a ghost. 
To put it another way, she is unwittingly performing the work of  mourning; 
she is entering an imaginary search for the space of  death in which she 
also repudiates death’s finality. In his Spectres of  Marx, Jacques Derrida 
begins with the premise that “haunting belongs to the structure of  every 
hegemony” (37). That is to say, within every dominant discourse or, indeed, 
dominant world system (such as capitalism) there is a repressed order of  
value which is hidden but not eradicated, an alternative which threatens, 
in fact, perpetual insurrection. Derrida creates a pun, “hauntology”: every 
social ontology is also the condition of  being haunted. With this in mind, 
it is interesting to see how vigorously Australian scholars currently adopt 
the trope of  haunting—Uncanny Australia takes it for granted, as does Sneja 
Gunew’s fine contribution (and I have used it myself  to talk about the 
Stolen Generations). If  we are to avoid what I have called the seductive 
allure of  “terminological Gothicism”—the simple pleasure of  invoking the 
decorative vocabulary of  spectres and phantoms—then the metaphor of  
haunting needs too to be considered a strategic discourse.
Derrida insists that there are two central issues here: anachronism and justice 
claims. Using Shakespeare’s Hamlet, he affirms that the time of  revenant 
interception is always “out of  joint” (to use Hamlet’s words). Just as the 
logic of  haunting is the destruction of  the opposition of  “to be or not to 
be,” so too it rejects the sovereignty of  the present (and the promise of  
the future) to re-present what we might call “apparitional subjects.” The 
no-longer-living rupture time—philosophically at least—in order to make 
a claim, to register ghostly disquiet. Fundamentally these are justice claims: 
the ghost requires us not to forget the wrongs of  history and to work for 
reparation in the future, for the arrivants, the not-yet-born or arrived. This 
use of  haunting is to my mind a wholly radical re-imagining of  a kind of  
trans-historical community, an insistence that responsibility comes from 
the debt of  what has gone before and extends into an obligation to the 
future. (Foucault argued that if  we accept the principle of  heterotopias, 
we must also accept heterochrony; what would it mean to imagine Australia 
as riven by multiple times, perhaps not in the way he envisaged, but in this 
deconstructive sense?)
The figure of  the ghost—to return to writing—is perhaps associated with 
spooky tales of  bygone ages, with torch-lit or séanced adolescent thrills, with 
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naïve anti-rationalism or downright dumb credulity. The ghost is emblematic 
of  the presence that cannot be fully figured, the paradigm, if  you will, for 
the representational conundrums of  writing-loss-into-being. Yet metaph-
orically this attachment we have to virtuality, the phantasmic, the magical, 
the indeterminate, the weirdly dematerialised, locates the wish to venture 
across physical and ideological boundaries, to assess the claims the dead have 
on us to be heard and acknowledged, the claim, moreover, of  unreconciled 
alterity. I have in mind here not just the dead, but those made invisible or 
voiceless by our culture. Alphonso Lingis (following Blanchot’s Unavowable 
Community and Jean-Luc Nancy’s Inoperable Community) calls these subjects 
“the community of  those who have nothing in common” and this seems to 
me the great challenge of  constructing an “ethics of  remembering.”
I rang my father recently to ask him if  he remembered our walk to see the 
sunken plane. He did, but said that what we saw was not a Japanese plane—
one of  these fell further out in the bay—but a Dutch amphibious craft, 
which had flown from Java with a load of  refugees, had been moored in the 
bay and was one of  eight sunk during the bombing. My brother and I were 
apparently mistaken, and all my life I had believed that my dream was based 
on the search for a Japanese pilot. My father also told me that he had taken 
a souvenir from the plane. With a fretsaw he removed part of  a propeller 
and remodelled it into a lamp-base. Until that phone-call I had forgotten the 
aeroplane lamp, but suddenly saw it again, lumpish and displaced, a rather 
kitschy object, which we eventually dumped unceremoniously when we left 
the Kimberleys.
My father retrieved the material sign; I the immaterial dream, based on false 
belief. At first I felt stupidly disconfirmed, but think now that children’s 
imaginings have their own integrity—dream knowledge is not, after all, 
historical knowledge; it is its emotional and figurative residue, its ingenious 
symbology. I suppose too that I would like to leave room in critical 
commentary for some kind of  para-historical negotiation. I have in mind here 
what the French novelist Georges Perec calls “fictive memory” (129). In the 
sixties Perec and his friend Robert Bober worked on a film about immigrants 
on Ellis Island in New York from 1880-1940 (134-38). They considered the 
film a work of  memory, even though neither had ever left Europe. It was 
densely researched, scrupulously compassionate and concerned with ethical 
responsibility for the community of  the displaced. Perec’s “fictive memory” 
is what he calls “a memory that might have belonged to me,” imagined from 
a position of  solidarity (129). Of  course, the term sounds oxymoronic, 
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perhaps slightly fraudulent, a fancy term merely for the art of  fiction. But 
Perec insisted there was a zone in which we enter history as a floating ghost 
might, looking around, absorbing details, affections and experiences, yet 
not wholly actualised. Neither subject nor object, this is a position, one 
might say, of  ethical transitivity. In phenomenological terms both reading 
and writing operate in this way. We engage in spooky projections, we read 
and write across thresholds of  actuality, even plausibility; we detach and 
attach with spirited mobility, gratuitous and energetic. “Never does the soul 
think without the phantasm,” Aristotle famously wrote in Rhetorics (qtd. 
in Castoriadis 228). By phantasm he meant the work of  imagination and 
what is interesting here is the perception, twenty-one centuries ago, of  the 
centrality of  the connection between the sensible and the intelligible, the 
assertion that all thought (theorin)—like dreams—has both excursive and 
figurative functions. 
CULTURAL DREAMING
Even tourist visitors to Australia have heard of  “the Dreaming” or 
“Dreamtime,” the designation, originally by Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, 
for the cultural mode and expression of  indigenous Australian narratives. 
The term is a peculiar one: initially a kind of  ethnographic attempt to 
contain collectively produced stories apparently unbounded, always crossing 
into the real, it is now part of  Aboriginal English, pragmatically assimilated, 
as it were. Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra point out that “the many Aboriginal 
words in different languages that are now automatically translated as ‘the 
Dreaming’ normally have no semantic connection to dreams or dreaming” 
(28). Moreover, they go on, “[t]he unusual syntax of  the word, combining 
a definite article with a gerund, with no agent presumed to be doing the 
dreaming and no object that is being dreamt, is a product of  the grammar 
of  English, a grammar deformed by certain English speakers for their 
own purposes to create a specific form of  discourse which renounces the 
standard language and the dominant rationality” (28). They are interested 
in identifying the term as one driven by delegitimation and in pointing 
out how mediated by non-Aboriginal agents is our understanding of  
indigenous knowledges. In its favour, perhaps, one could claim that at least 
“the Dreaming” has a cultural signification released from, say, the Freudian 
understanding of  a dream as a symptom before it is a representation, the 
delusional pictograph of  an individual psyche.
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Might there be a cultural dreaming beyond these disputed discourses? 
Might the metaphorics of  dreaming allow for, or even inaugurate, a social 
imaginary that includes the forms of  daydreaming necessary to imagine 
a politics of  hope? Speaking to Mary Zournaz, Michael Taussig makes a 
plea for recognition of  states of  suspension, what he calls “in-between 
consciousness” between dreaming and awakening, which he claims furnishes 
both writing and reading experiences and the production of  social hope (52-57). 
W. E. H. Stanner’s White Man Got No Dreaming reminds us that from the 
indigenous perspective white Australia is deficient, bereft, unable to sustain 
narratives that might relativise the present and invoke the mysterious as an 
essential element of  existence. The case for dreaming as a cultural and social 
metaphor is certainly beyond the scope of  this paper, but I want to signal my 
interest in the dream trope as a potential mode of  radical figuration, of  the 
recognition of  cultural stagings of  desire, the inclusion of  the apparitional 
subject as one with whom we might have intercourse, the undertaking of  
forms of  thinking that are implicitly heterotopic, crazed in their territorial 
reach, unstable in their projections, and beyond the hegemonic tyranny of  
monolithic ideological systems.
In his recently released five-hour director’s cut of  his 1991 film, Until the End 
of  the World, Wim Wenders politicises, in a somewhat clumsy way, the act of  
dreaming. The movie ends in central Australia, in an Aboriginal community, 
one governed by a European scientist who is developing apparatuses of  
vision to cure blindness. He also, coincidentally, has developed a machine 
for recording dreams, and the male and female protagonists both become 
enchanted, to the point of  madness, with involuted and repetitious acts 
of  re-dreaming. The film identifies a “disease of  images” (the madness 
of  revisiting dreams), which it counter-poses to the redemptive power of  
words (the screenplay is by Peter Carey, who perhaps had a vested interest 
in recommending words over images). In this story it is the Aboriginal 
community which refuses to have their dreams recorded, believing that it 
can only be an act of  misappropriation and spiritual evacuation. Wenders 
is possibly guilty of  ascribing to Aborigines primitivist superstition (rather 
than endorsing their rationally motivated resistance), but the movie also 
rehearses anxieties about dreaming itself—in its collective form, as cultural 
knowledge, it is apparently too destabilizing and fragile to be seen; in its 
individual form it is pathologically self-regarding. I would like to believe that 
there is an intermediate aesthetic possibility here, that for all its bewildering 
emplotment and representational volatility, the dream is a mode of  heuristic 
narrative we should take very seriously. This is a vague proposition; it is, 
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however, an argument for more stylised literary and cultural meditations, 
for an imagistic hermeneutic and for the radical forms of  day-dreaming 
necessary to re-imagine community.
SAUNTERING, ETHICS
At this point I would like to signal my reservations about positing dream-
work as a kind of  viable heuristic and conceptual model. The principle 
reservation is in regard to the loss of  the contextual and the corporeal. 
Ironically, the dream I had as a child was about wishing to make a body; 
it was a refusal of  the lost object as the centre of  history, imagining and 
affective response. It was also about walking. I was not swimming, I was 
walking on the ocean floor. In his odd little essay on walking, Henry David 
Thoreau contemplates the word saunter, which he particularly loves. The 
word derives from the description of  medieval pilgrims; they are Sainte 
Terrer—saunterers, holy landers. Then again, Thoreau says, perhaps the 
term is from sans terrer, without land or home, a wanderer. Whichever it 
might be, to learn the holiness of  the land as one walks upon it, or to 
embrace vagrancy as a philosophical attitude, is recommended by Thoreau 
as the condition of  unbounded thinking and cordial humanity. We grow 
grumpy if  we remain still, at our desks, or confined in our institutions; we 
know our amplitude if  we push into space with our own bodies, rehearse 
heterotopic encounters and our own displacement. As Henri Lefebvre 
reminds us: “The whole of  (social) space proceeds from the body . . . 
(405).3 
So where am I walking to in this chattering saunter? I wish to link a 
crazy map, the emblem of  national space marvellously and irresistibly 
complicated, with politics and ethics. The heterotopic model is above all 
a critique of  falsifying totalities, of  their erasure of  locations of  culture 
which deserve our regard not because they contribute to a national 
narrative, but because they enjoin us to recognise the beautiful complexity 
of  difference. And difference ought, of  course, to be consubstantiating, the 
groundwork of  reciprocities and honourable translations. Homi Bhabha 
has argued that our culture is already translational. It is the transnational 
aspect of  cultures—“immigration, diaspora, displacement, relocation” 
which requires us newly to address particularity (“Postcolonial” 438). “The 
great though unsettling advantage of  this position,” Bhabha says, “is that 
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it makes you increasingly aware of  the construction of  culture and the 
invention of  tradition” (438).
Australian scholars have conscientiously and intelligently led the way in 
attempting to construct an ethics of  consubstantiating difference. I have 
in mind the e-journal, borderlands, public intellectuals like Robert Manne, 
Deborah Bird-Rose and Ghassan Hage, a wide range of  novelists—Brian 
Castro, Michelle de Kretser, Eva Sallis and others—all of  whom together 
imagine the subjective and inter-subjective worlds of  hybrid communities. 
They instantiate Kafka’s “observation that is also an act,” producing writing 
that seeks to intervene socially and in the spirit of  metaphysical confidence. 
Of  particular importance to me is Rosalyn Diprose’s Corporeal Generosity. 
Her chapter entitled “Truth, Cultural Difference and Decolonization” is an 
extraordinarily lucid reading of  both Friedrich Nietzsche’s and Emmanuel 
Levinas’s philosophies in relation to documents like Bringing Them Home. 
She argues that the model of  community based on shared experience 
must give way to one based on ineradicable difference, a premise which 
requires an economy of  unconditional generosity. “Ineradicable difference” 
is a disturbing and unsettling premise. It allows for no self-serving pity, no 
coercive identification, but does assume imbricated interests and the perhaps 
necessary risk of  losing one’s own centrality in the scheme of  things. Edith 
Wyschogrod’s An Ethics of  Remembering, subtitled History, Heterology and the 
Nameless Others, also entertains these arguments, but insists that community 
must be imagined as a gift economy, offering, among other things, the gift of  
hope. And so the sort of  dreaming I am thinking of  is that which Siegfried 
Kracaeur calls “the social hieroglyph,” the figuring—he calls it “allegorical” 
figuring—of  historical and social narratives embedded in what might seem 
otherwise merely ephemeral, private and internalised experiences (qtd. in 
Rodowick 153-61)
The site I visited as a child could only be seen by commitment to a 
strenuous and exhausting walk—or so it seemed then, to an eight-year-
old girl. And although it signified war, death and the trauma of  history, 
it was also a ruin, a relic, a marvellously protean thing. Beneath the sea 
slugs, the barnacles, the crenellated weeds, beneath the moist and glossy 
substances of  submarine life, was the wreck of  history, “not the story of  
the wreck, but the wreck itself,” to quote Adrienne Rich. My dream was 
not exemplary, merely illustrative, the product not of  thoughtful regard, 
but aleatory memory-making. Yet it recurred and persisted, and I have 
retold it here as the skeleton of  a somewhat disarticulated argument. I 
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have told of  a far-fetching child, walking into impossibility, gathering up 
fragments, as the modest journey into symbolic forms of  knowing that 
might retrieve lost subjects, visit dislocated others, that might enter the 
oceanic oblivion of  history and retrieve a small significant fragment to 
cherish and hold dear.
ENDNOTES
 1 These were lecture notes from 1967, discovered after his death in June 1984, 
and never intended for publication, but their prescience and assertiveness 
were and remained central to the spatial turn in cultural studies. 
 2 These are of  course Foucault’s criteria but one should be mindful of  
critiques, like Homi Bhabha’s which insists on hybridity and the inter-space of  
translation (see The Location of  Culture). 
 3 Lefebvre rejects what he calls “abstract spatiality” and even suggests that 
the senses, differentiated, prefigure social interactions. His Production of  
Space is important because “spatial practice” includes the categories of  
representational, conceptual and lived spaces.
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